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V 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HERMES ASSOCIATES, a : 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, Case No. 900299-CA 
vs. 
: Oral Argument Priority 
PARK'S SPORTSMAN, a Utah No. 16 
corporation, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal as of right from a final judgment in a 
civil case. The judgment appealed from was entered February 
28, 1990. (R. 163-65.) Appellant filed its Notice of Appeal 
on March 28, 1990. (R. 174-75.) The Utah Supreme Court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 
1990). The Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) . This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did defendant assume the role of surety where defend-
ant was required to perform obligations under a contract with 
plaintiff only if a third party failed to perform as expected? 
This is a question of contract interpretation subject to 
review by this Court for correctness, with no deference to the 
ruling of the trial court. 50 West Broadway Associates v. Re-
development Agency, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 1989). 
2. Was defendant relieved of its obligations to plain-
tiff under a contract, the obligation of which was contingent 
upon and surety for the performance of a contract between 
plaintiff and a third party, where plaintiff modified its 
contract with the third party without the consent of defendant? 
This is a question of contract interpretation subject to 
review by this Court for correctness, with no deference to the 
ruling of the trial court. Id. 
3. Did the trial court err in attempting to avoid the 
prejudicial effect of plaintiff's modifications of its contract 
with a third party, performance of which was essentially 
guaranteed by defendant, by reforming the contract between 
plaintiff and defendant, where reformation was not pleaded nor 
requested and there was no proof of mutual mistake? 
The question of whether reformation was available under 
the undisputed facts is a question of law subject to review by 
this Court for correctness, with no deference to the ruling of 
the trial court. See Bown v. Loveland, 678 P. 2d 292, 295 (Utah 
1984) . 
4. Did the trial court err in awarding plaintiff pre-
judgment interest on obligations owed by defendant under a 
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contract, where defendant was unable to determine whether the 
obligations were actually owed due to plaintiff's failure to 
disclose necessary information? 
The question of whether interest was available is a 
question of law subject to review by this Court for correct-
ness, with no deference to the ruling of the trial court. See 
Joraensen v. John Clay and Co., 660 P.2d 229, 233 (Utah 1983). 
5. Did the trial court err in holding it had no discre-
tion to award defendant its reasonable attorney fees incurred 
by reason of plaintiff's objections to defendant's request for 
summary disposition, where there were no disputed issues of 
fact and no purpose for a trial? 
The question of whether the trial court had the authority 
to award attorney fees is a question of law subject to review 
by this Court for correctness, with no deference to the ruling 
of the trial court. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 
169 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Park's is not aware of any constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpreta-
tion is determinative of Issues 1 through 4 above. Rule 11 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is relevant to Issue 5: 
Every pleading, motion, and other 
paper of a party represented by an attorney 
shall be signed by at least one attorney 
of record in his individual name who is 
duly licensed to practice in the state of 
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Utah. The attorney's address also shall 
be stated. A party who is not represented 
by an attorney shall sign his pleading, 
motion, or other paper and state his 
address. Except when otherwise specifical-
ly provided by rule or statute, pleadings 
need not be verified or accompanied by 
affidavit. The rule in equity that the 
averments of an answer under oath must be 
overcome by the testimony of two witnesses 
or of one witness sustained by corrobora-
ting circumstances is abolished. The 
signature of an attorney or party con-
stitutes a certificate by him that he has 
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; 
that to the best of his knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief formed after reasonable 
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, 
or reversal of existing law, and that it 
is not interposed for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation. If a pleading, motion, or 
other paper is not signed, it shall be 
stricken unless it is signed promptly after 
the omission is called to the attention of 
the pleader or movant. If a pleading, 
motion, or other paper is signed in viola-
tion of this rule, the court, upon motion 
or upon its own initiative, shall impose 
upon the person who signed it, a repre-
sented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay 
to the other party or parties the amount 
of the reasonable expenses incurred because 
of the filing of the pleading, motion, or 
other paper, including a reasonable attor-
ney f s fee. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a civil action to 
enforce a written contract. 
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below, 
Plaintiff ("Hermes") filed its Complaint on September 16, 
1988. (R. 2-5.) Defendant ("Park's") filed its Answer and 
Demand for Jury Trial on September 28, 1988. (R. 8-10.) 
Although no discovery had yet been conducted, Hermes filed a 
Certification for Readiness for Trial on November 30, 1988. 
(R. 11.) Park's commenced discovery on December 1, 1988 (R. 
12-14), and served its Objection to Request for Trial Setting 
and Demand for Jury Trial on December 7, 1988. (R. 15-16.) 
The parties proceeded with some limited discovery, and on 
September 1, 1989, Hermes filed a second request for trial 
setting. (R. 21.) Park's served its Objection to Request for 
Trial Setting and Request for Scheduling Conference on 
September 12, 1989, asserting that discovery was not yet 
complete, that Hermes's prior interrogatory answers were 
insufficient, and that Park's anticipated filing a dispositive 
motion at the conclusion of discovery which would occur within 
the next thirty to sixty days. (R. 27-28.) On the same date 
as Park's Objection, however, the court filed a notice schedul-
ing a pre-trial for November 17, 1989, and a trial for December 
4, 1989. (R. 24.) 
Park's took additional depositions on October 3, 1989, 
transcripts of which were completed on or about November 7, 
1989. (R. 31-34.) On November 10, 1989, Park's served its 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 3 6-37) and a supporting memo-
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randum (R. 38-60) based in part on a deposition taken October 
3, 1989. Hermes responded with a Request that Defendant's 
Motion For Summary [sic] Not Be Considered (R. 61-62), which 
asserted that the motion was barred, by Rule 4-501 of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration, because it was served within 
thirty days of the scheduled trial date. 
At the pre-trial held on November 17, 1989, Park's sought 
relief from the time requirements of Rule 4-501 (R. 86-87) , but 
the court declined to hear the motion. The court vacated the 
trial date of December 4, 1989, and rescheduled the matter for 
trial on January 11, 1990. (R. 63.) 
Park's counsel made several additional contacts with 
Hermes's counsel to urge that the matter be submitted for 
summary decision. Hermesfs counsel stated that he would review 
the matter, and on December 18, 1989, finally stated that he 
was not willing to submit the matter for summary decision. (R. 
98-101.) 
The case proceeded to trial on January 11, 1990. (R. 
102.) At the beginning of trial, the court urged Hermes to 
identify the areas of factual dispute. (Tr. 1-7.) Henries 
asserted that there were factual issues (Tr. 6-7) , so the court 
permitted testimony. At the conclusion of Hermes's case, 
Park's put on no evidence other than evidence of attorney fees 
incurred by reason of Hermes's refusal to submit the matter for 
summary decision. (Tr. 76-79.) 
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At the conclusion of the evidence and after presentation 
of arguments, the court entered judgment against Park's and sua 
sponte reformed the Lease Cancellation Agreement by (a) es-
tablishing an amount of Gart gross sales which would relieve 
Park's of its obligations regardless of the size of the leased 
space or whether Gart had paid any percentage rent to Hermes, 
and (b) requiring Hermes to annually notify Park's of the Gart 
gross sales. (R. 105-06.) On Park's request for attorney 
fees, the court found that there were no disputed issues of 
fact and that no relevant facts were presented at trial which 
were not inherent in the documents or which had not already 
been stipulated to by the parties in their memoranda (Tr. 101-
02) , but held that it did not have discretion to award attorney 
fees. (Tr. 102.) 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 155-62) and 
a Judgment (R. 163-65) were entered on February 28, 1990. 
Park's filed its Notice of Appeal on March 28, 1990. (R. 174-
75.) 
C. Statement of Facts. Plaintiff Hermes Associates 
("Hermes") is a Utah partnership which operates a shopping 
center known as The Family Center at Midvalley, located at 
Redwood Road and Interstate 215 in Salt Lake County. (Tr. 16.) 
On May 20, 1982, Park's Sportsman, Inc. ("Park's"), a Utah 
corporation, became a tenant at The Family Center at Midvalley 
and executed a lease agreement with Hermes. (Tr. 17; Exhibit 
7 
6.) The parties subsequently determined to terminate the 
lease, and a Lease Cancellation Agreement, dated April 2, 1987, 
was executed by the parties. (Tr. 19; Exhibit 1.) (A copy of 
the Lease Cancellation Agreement is reproduced in the Appen-
dix.) The Lease Cancellation Agreement provides, in essence, 
that the obligations under the Park's lease will be terminated 
upon Hermes entering into a substitute lease with Gart Brothers 
Sporting Goods, Inc., and that Park's will pay $1,000.00 per 
month to Hermes until such time as Gart Brothers' sales reach 
a certain level. 
Hermes subsequently entered into a lease with Gart 
Brothers, executed on April 7, 1987. (Tr. 33; Exhibit 5.) 
Hermes never gave Park's a copy of the Gart lease. (Tr. 
47.) The terms of the Gart lease were substantially different 
from the Park's lease. For example, the Park's lease provided 
for a rental obligation of 3i% of the gross sales, with a 
minimum guaranteed amount of $4.18 per square foot, or 
$56,430.00 per year. (Sales of $1,612,285.70 would be required 
for the rentals computed as a percentage to exceed the minimum 
base rent.) (Tr. 57-58; Exhibit 6.) The Gart lease, in 
contrast, provided for percentage rent of 3%, with a base rent 
of $4.00 per square foot, or $54,000.00 per year. (Sales of 
$1,800,000.00 would be required for the percentage rent to 
exceed the base rent.) (Tr. 57-58; Exhibit 5.) 
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There is no evidence that Hermes ever informed Park's of 
the terms of the Gart lease. (Tr. 47.) The parties had an-
ticipated that Gart's sales would exceed the minimum required 
to invoke the percentage rent figures. (Exhibit 10.) Because 
Park's was obligated to Hermes only if Gart failed to perform 
as expected, Park's sought information from Hermes concerning 
Gart's gross sales. Hermes refused to provide the information, 
other than to state that the sales had not reached the required 
level. (Exhibit 10.) 
On October 26, 1987, Hermes and Gart amended their lease 
agreement without notice to or consent from Park's. (Tr. 45; 
Exhibit 11.) Under the amended agreement, the space leased was 
increased to 20,820 square feet. (The prior leased space was 
13,500 square feet.) The amendment to the lease also changed 
the volume of sales required before the percentage rents would 
exceed the minimum base rent. Whereas the break point for 
percentage rent under the initial Gart agreement was 
$1,800,000.00, the break point under the amended Gart agreement 
was $3,232,400.00. (Exhibit 11.) 
In response to requests from Park's for information 
concerning Gart Brothers' gross sales, Hermes took the position 
that Park's was obligated to continue payments under the Lease 
Cancellation Agreement until Gart had paid $10,000.00 in 
percentage rents, regardless of the terms of the Gart lease. 
(Exhibit 14.) Under the initial Gart lease, gross sales of 
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$2,13 3,000.00 would be required to obligate Gart Brothers to 
pay percentage rents of $10,000.00 and thus terminate Park's 
obligation under the Lease Cancellation Agreement. (Tr. 61.) 
Under the amendment to the lease, the required $10,000.00 in 
percentage rents would not be reached until after gross sales 
were $3,565,733.30.x 
Park's viewed its obligation to Hermes as being terminated 
and stopped making payments because Park's was unable to obtain 
information concerning Gart's gross sales, and because the Gart 
lease had been substantially modified without the knowledge or 
consent of Park's. Hermes thereafter brought this action to 
recover the payments it claimed to be due under the Lease 
Cancellation Agreement. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Lease Cancellation Agreement between Park's and Hermes 
provided that Park's would make certain monthly payments to 
Hermes, but that the obligation to make those payments would 
terminate if and when the new tenant, Gart Brothers, reached 
a sufficient volume of sales so that it was required to pay 
$10,000.00 in percentage rents in excess of the base rent. 
lThe amended Gart lease provided a base rental of 
$96,972.00 per year. That figure divided by 3% (.03) yields 
the break point for percentage rent of $3,232,400.00. If rents 
are to exceed the base by $10,000.00, the total rent would be 
$106,972.00. That figure divided by .03 yields $3,565,733.30, 
which is the total gross sales required to achieve $10,000.00 
in percentage rent payments under the amended Gart lease. 
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This condition placed Park's in the position of surety for Gart 
Brothers. When Hermes thereafter modified the Gart lease 
without the consent or knowledge of Park's and further refused 
to give Park's any information concerning the terms of the 
lease or the gross sales achieved under the lease, Park's 
obligation to Hermes was terminated by operation of law. 
The trial court implicitly acknowledged that the modifica-
tion of the Gart lease was prejudicial to Park's by reforming 
the contract to eliminate part of the effect of the Gart lease 
modification. Reformation was a remedy which was neither 
sought by the parties nor justified by the evidence. The 
appropriate remedy under the circumstances was termination of 
any ongoing obligations of Park's under the Lease Cancellation 
Agreement. 
The trial court also erred in awarding interest on the 
past due payments. Park's failure to make the payments was 
justified by Hermes' refusal to provide information concerning 
the Gart Brothers gross sales, and by Hermes' claim that Park's 
obligation would continue until Gart Brothers paid $10,000.00 
in percentage rents, even though under the amendment, the level 
of Gart sales required to reach $10,000.00 in percentage rents 
had almost doubled. Under these circumstances, it would be 
inequitable to award Hermes interest as a reward for its own 
wrongful conduct. 
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Finally, the trial court erred in holding that it did not 
have discretion to award Park's its reasonable attorney fees 
incurred in defending this action. Hermes needlessly increased 
the cost of the litigation by objecting to Park's attempts to 
present the matter for summary disposition, and persisting in 
its demand for a trial when there were no issues of fact to be 
tried. It is implicit from the terms of both Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 
(Supp. 1990) that a party can be sanctioned where an otherwise 
valid lawsuit is conducted in a oppressive manner or in a 
manner which evidences bad faith. The trial court has inherent 
power to punish and discourage such behavior. The trial court 
had discretion to award Park's its attorney fees, and the case 
should be remanded to allow the trial court to make such an 
award. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PARK"S OBLIGATION TO HERMES, WHICH WAS CONTINGENT 
UPON GART BROTHERS PERFORMANCE, WAS TERMINATED WHEN 
HERMES MODIFIED ITS LEASE WITH GART BROTHERS. 
The Lease Cancellation Agreement between Hermes and Park's 
provides that Park's obligations thereunder will terminate when 
Gart Brothers pays $10,000 in percentage rents to Hermes in one 
year. The parties anticipated at the time of execution that 
the contingency would occur within a year. Park's was not 
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aware of the terms of the Gart lease at the time the Lease 
Cancellation Agreement was executed, but assumed that the Gart 
lease would be similar to the Park's lease• In fact, there 
were substantial differences between the two leases. The level 
of sales required to achieve $10,000 in percentage rent was 
significantly higher under the Gart lease than under the Park's 
lease. 
Park's commenced making payments under the Lease Cancella-
tion Agreement, and subsequently sought verification from 
Hermes concerning Gart Brothers gross sales. Hermes refused 
to provide the information. Park's later discovered that 
Hermes had amended its lease agreement with Gart. Under the 
amended Gart lease, the level of sales required to achieve 
$10,000 in percentage rents was nearly doubled. 
One of the implied terms of any contract, including the 
Lease Cancellation Agreement, is a mutual covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. This covenant is breached when a party 
acts in a way to make the other party's performance more 
difficult. When a party has breached the covenant by making 
the performance of the other more difficult, the other party 
is excused from further performance. Zion's Properties, Inc. 
v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Utah 1975). See also 1-5 Truck 
Sales & Service Co. v. Underwood, 32 Wash. App. 4, 645 P.2d 
716, 720 n.l (1982); Potrero Homes v. Western Orbis Co., 28 
Cal. App. 3d 450, 104 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1972). Hermes breached 
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its covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and thereby 
discharged Park's from further obligations under the Lease 
Cancellation Agreement, when Hermes changed the nature of the 
Gart least without the consent of Park's. 
This result is corroborated by analogy to the law of 
suretyship. The Lease Cancellation Agreement puts Park's in 
the position of guaranteeing that Hermes will receive a minimum 
sum from its agreement with Gart Brothers. If Gart's 
percentage rent does not reach $10,000 in a given 12 month 
period, Hermes is entitled to receive $12,000 from Park's 
during that period. Park's is thus placed in a suretyship 
role, with Hermes and Gart occupying the roles of creditor and 
principal obligor. The fact that this relationship is not the 
result of an express surety agreement is not relevant. "There 
is no required form for a surety contract and it is not neces-
sary that the [party acting as surety] be labeled 'surety' on 
the face of the contract." Andrus v. Zion's First National 
Bank of Qgden, 99 Idaho 724, 726, 588 P.2d 452, 454 (1978). 
See also Fluke Capital & Management Services Co. v. Richmond, 
106 Wash. 2d 614, 724 P.2d 356, 361 (1986); 74 Am. Jur. 2d 
Suretyship § 7 (1974). 
In determining whether a suretyship exists, the primary 
focus is whether the alleged surety is responsible to the 
creditor for the performance of the principal obligor. When 
"the ultimate effect of the transaction [is] to secure the 
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debts of another," a suretyship exists. Andrus, 588 P.2d at 
454. See also State v. McKinnon, 667 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Alaska 
1983) ; 74 Am. Jur. 2d Suretyship § 1 (1974) ; 72 C.J.S. Princi-
pal and Surety § 33 (1987). If the nature of the transaction 
creates a suretyship, the incidents surrounding the suretyship 
may vary within certain latitude without changing the character 
of the relationship. In the instant case, Park's is responsi-
ble to Hermes for up to $60,000 in the event Gart fails to pay 
Hermes $10,000 annually in percentage rent for five years. 
Like other surety arrangements, Park's is excused from perform-
ance if Gart pays the required level of rent. The Lease 
Cancellation Agreement clearly operates to make Park's a surety 
for Gart's performance. 
Because Park's obligations were contingent on and surety 
for Gart's performance under the Gart lease, any change in the 
Gart lease affected Park's. The law provides that such changes 
terminate the obligation of the surety. 
Any agreement or dealing between the 
principal parties to an obligation or debt 
which essentially varies the term of the 
contract without the consent of the surety 
will release him from liability, even 
though the alteration may not injure him, 
or maybe beneficial to him. When the 
change is made without his consent, the 
surety is not bound by the contract in its 
altered form; it ceases to be his contract, 
and with that his obligation ceases. 
74 Am. Jur. 2d Suretyship § 41 (1974) (emphasis added). Accord 
Valley Bank & Trust v. Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc., 742 
15 
P.2d 105, 108-09 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 
1277 (Utah 1988) ; Gebrueder Heidemann, K.G. v. A.M.R. Corp., 
113 Idaho 510, 688 P.2d 1180, 1185 (Idaho 1984); Hester v. 
Ross, Banks, May, Cron & Cavin, 492 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1973). 
The facts of the instant case confirm the need for such 
a rule preventing Hermes from modifying the Gart lease without 
Park's consent. The amendment to the Gart lease nearly doubled 
the level of gross sales required to obligate Gart to pay 
$10,000 in percentage rent to Hermes.2 When Park's requested 
verification from Hermes of the amount of gross sales and an 
explanation of the effect of the lease modification, Gart's 
response was, in essence, a statement that Park's would remain 
obligated to Hermes until Gart paid $10,000 in percentage 
rents, regardless of any change of the Gart lease which might 
2The trial court acknowledged the prejudicial effect of 
the amendment to the Gart lease by attempting to reform the 
Lease Cancellation Agreement to provide that Park's obligations 
thereunder would terminate when Gart reached gross sales of 
$2,133,000.00, regardless of whether Gart paid any percentage 
rents to Hermes. Even as thus reformed, the amendment to the 
Gart lease still effected a material change in Park's risk. 
The amendment nearly doubled the base rent owed by Gart to 
Hermes and thereby increased the risk of Gart being unable to 
perform even its minimum obligations under the amended lease. 
In addition, reformation was not proper. No party sought 
reformation in its pleadings, although reformation must be 
specifically pleaded. Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 772 
(Utah 1985). Also lacking was any proof of the mutual mistake 
required to support a decree of reformation. Id. The only 
permissible remedy under the pleadings and the evidence was 
cancellation of Park's obligations, not reformation. 
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make achieve of that level of percentage rents less likely. 
(See Exhibit 14, a copy of which appears in the Appendix.) The 
response of the law to such conduct is simple, as described 
above: where Hermes made an agreement with Gart which affected 
the character of Park's obligations under the Lease Cancella-
tion Agreement, Park's was relieved of further obligations 
under the Lease Cancellation Agreement. The trial court's 
judgment to the contrary was in error and should be reversed. 
POINT II 
HERMES WAS NOT ENTITLED TO PRE-JUDGMENT 
INTEREST WHERE HERMES HAD FAILED AND REFUSED TO 
PROVIDE PARK'S WITH VERIFICATION OF THE AMOUNT DUE. 
The trial court held that Hermes had an implicit obliga-
tion as part of the Lease Cancellation Agreement to provide 
Park's with documentation concerning Gart Brother's gross 
sales. Without such information, it was impossible for Park's 
to determine whether it in fact owed any amounts to Hermes. 
Although interest is usually awarded where a fixed sum is 
due under a contract and not paid, the rule is different where 
the delay in payment is caused by the wrongful conduct of the 
person entitled to payment. Amoss v. Bennion, 23 Utah 2d 40, 
456 P.2d 172, 175 (1969); Blomcruist v. Bingham, 652 P.2d 900, 
902 (Utah 1982). Park's failure to make timely and monthly 
payments to Hermes was excusable by reason of Hermes' failure 
to provide documentation that the amount was actually due. 
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Park's obligation to pay interest under said circumstances was 
excused. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed 
with instructions to vacate the judgment for pre-judgment 
interest. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD DISCRETION TO AWARD 
ATTORNEY FEES HAS A SANCTION FOR HERMES1 CONDUCT 
IN INCREASING THE COST OF THE LITIGATION. 
There were no material disputed facts in this case. 
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment at the earliest 
possible opportunity following completion of discovery, but 
Hermes resisted the motion because it was not filed at least 
30 days prior to trial. Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(3) (g). 
After the trial date was subsequently vacated, however, Hermes 
continued to resist the suggestions of the trial court and 
Park's counsel that the case be submitted for summary decision. 
Both Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1987) proscribe conduct by a party which 
serves only to increase the cost of the litigation and is not 
made in good faith. The trial court in this case acknowledged 
that the case should have been summarily decided and that the 
trial was a waste of time. The court held, however, that it 
did not have discretion to award attorney's fees under those 
circumstances. Where a trial court applies an erroneous legal 
standard in exercising its discretion, the matter should be 
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reviewed for correctness and remanded to the trial court for 
decision in light of the correct legal standard. Ferris v. 
Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979). 
The trial court has inherit power to regulate the conduct 
of counsel and parties appearing before it. Park's presented 
testimony that the refusal of Hermes to submit the matter for 
summary decision increased the legal fees to Park's by at least 
$5,459.85. (Tr. 78.) Hermes' counsel signed and filed a 
request for a trial when there were no issues to be tried. 
Hermes submitted documents resisting Park's attempts to have 
the matter decided without a trial. The trial court had 
discretion to discourage such conduct by awarding Park's its 
attorney's fees. This case should be remanded to the trial 
court with instructions to determine whether an award of 
attorney's fees is appropriate under the circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
Park's obligations under the Lease Cancellation Agreement 
were contingent upon, and surety for, the performance of Gart 
Brothers under its subsequent lease with Hermes. The 
subsequent amendment and modification of the Gart lease by 
Hermes materially affected Park's rights and was made without 
Park's consent. The modification operated to discharge Park's 
future obligations under the Lease Cancellation Agreement and 
the trial court should have so held. 
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The trial erred in awarding Hermes interest for Park's 
delay in payment, where the delay was a result of Hermes 
unjustified refusal to provide documentation of the amount of 
Gart Brother's gross sales. 
Finally, the trial court had discretion to award plain-
tiff's its attorney's fees, and committed error as a matter of 
law in failing to exercise that discretion. 
The judgment in favor of Hermes should be vacated and the 
case remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Park's, no 
cause of action. Alternatively, the portion of the judgment 
awarding Hermes pre-judgment interest should be vacated. 
In any event, this Court should hold that the trial court 
had discretion to award a reasonable attorney fee under the 
circumstances of this case, and the case should be remanded 
with a direction to award such a fee. 
DATED this 18th day of September, 1990. 
JACKSON HOWARD, <// 
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 
18th day of September, 1990. 
Nick J. Colessides, Esq. 
466 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3303 
Attorney for Appellee 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
» / • 
NICK J. COLESSIDES (# 696) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
466 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3303 
Tele: (801) 521-4441 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HERMES ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PARK'S SPORTSMAN, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. C-88-6074 
Judge: Wilkinson 
This matter came on regularly for trial, pursuant 
to notice, on the 11th day of January, 1990, before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding without a jury; 
Plaintiff Hermes Associates was present by and through J. Rees 
Jensen, one of its General Partners, and plaintiff was being 
represented by Nick J. Colessides, attorney at law; defendant 
Park's Sportsman, a Utah corporation, was present by Russell 
W. Park, its president, and was being represented by Jackson 
Howard, attorney at law; the Court having adduced and 
received evidence on behalf of all parties, and the Court 
having heard argument on behalf of all parties, and the matter 
00^55 
having been submitted to the Court, now upon motion of Nick J. 
Colessides, attorney for plaintiff, and good cause otherwise 
appearing therefor, the Court makes the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about May 20, 1982, Hermes as Landlord, 
and Park's as Tenant, entered into a lease agreement (the 
"Park's Lease") affecting certain retail commercial space 
located at Hcar-mes1 shopping center, known as the Midvalley 
Family Center, at 5666 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
2. Defendant Park's entered into possession of 
the leased premises and operated its retail sporting goods 
store until sometime in April 2nd, 1987. 
3. On April 2nd, 1987, Hermes and Park's entered 
into a LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT, canceling the Park's 
Lease. 
4. The LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT obligated 
Park's to commence on May 1, 1987, and continue for sixty (60) 
months, the payment of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars for 
each and every month, subject to the percentage lease 
agreement and gross sales of $ 1,800,000.00 of Gart Bros. 
5- The LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT became 
effective as of the effective date upon which Hermes would 
enter (and in fact entered) into a lease agreement with Gart 
Bros. 
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6. As far as the sales volume is concerned the 
LEASE TERMINATION AGREEMENT applies to all of the space, 
20,820 square feet, leased to Gart Bros. 
7. The LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT is the 
operative document wherein the respective rights and 
obligations of the plaintiff and defendant are clearly set 
forth. 
8. The LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT is a new 
agreement, valid and subsisting in and of itself, and not 
dependent upon any other document, except as it relates to 
paragraph 4 above. 
10. The LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT contained, 
inter alia, the following terms: 
1. Lease Agreement Cancellation. The Commercial 
and Industrial Lease Agreement of May 20, 1982, and all 
subsequent addendums or modifications are incorporated herein 
by reference. The said Lease Agreement and all addendums and 
modifications are hereby declared canceled effective as of the 
date on which a Lease Agreement between Hermes and Gart 
Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc., becomes effective. 
2. Consideration. In consideration of the 
cancellation of said Agreement, Park's does by this instant 
agree to pay Hermes the sum of One Thousand Dollars 
($1,000.00) per month for a term of sixty (60) months 
commencing on the 1st day of May, 1987, and continuing 
thereafter until sixty (60) installments have been paid or 
unless the said obligation is terminated or canceled by reason 
of the operation of Provision 3 following. 
3. Termination and Rebate. Hermes acknowledges 
that effective on the date that Hermes enters into a Lease 
Agreement with Gart Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc., for the 
lease rights of Park's to the premises located at 
approximately 5666 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
that this Lease Cancellation Agreement will become 
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contemporaneously effective. When and if Gart Brothers 
Sporting Goods, Inc., make a percentage rent payment to Hermes 
in any twelve (12) month period of a sum in excess of Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) for the subject demised 
premises, Hermes will cancel the payment requirements of 
Provision 2 above and thereafter Park's will have no 
obligation to make further installment payments, provided that 
all installment payments previously due and payable to Hermes 
have been paid. It is further provided that at such time as 
Hermes receives the first said percentage rental payment in 
excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) from Gart Brothers 
Sporting Goods, Inc., Hermes will refund to Park's up to 
Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) in accordance to the 
amount due and paid by Park's during the twelve (12) months 
for which said percentage rent was paid to Hermes by Gart 
Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc. 
11. The effective date of a lease between Hermes 
and Gart Bros, (the "Gart Lease") was the 7th day of April, 
1987. 
12. The terms of the Parks Sportsman's Lease, 
dated May 20, 1982, were not taken over by Gart Bros. 
13. The obligation of Park's to pay the $ 
1,000.00 per month was to continue until Gart Bros made to 
Hermes a percentage rent payment in any twelve (12) month 
period of a sum in excess of Ten Thousand ($ 10,000.00) 
Dollars, under the Gart Lease. 
14. Park's commenced the monthly payments 
pursuant to the LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT and made eleven 
(11) payments thereunder amounting to the sum of $ 11,000.00. 
15. Park's did not pay the monthly payment due on 
April 1, 1988, and made no other payments thereafter. 
16. As of the date of the trial Park's has not 
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made twenty two (22) required monthly payments, amounting to 
the sum of Twenty Two Thousand ($ 22,000.00) Dollars. 
17. It was not intended by Hermes that Park's be 
excused from performance (i.e., the payment of $ 1,000.00 per 
month) on April 2, or on October 1, 1987, or January 1, 1988, 
or April 1, 1988, except for the provisions of paragraphs 2 
and 3 of the LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT. 
18. The Court finds that any subsequent (to April 
2, 1987) agreement(s) between Hermes and Gart Bros is not and 
it is not deemed to be a novation of the LEASE CANCELLATION 
AGREEMENT. 
19. The Court finds that Park's was not a surety 
nor a guarantor of the Gart Bros Lease, or any of the 
obligations thereunder. 
20. The Court finds that Gart Bros would not 
assume the obligations of Park's under the Park's Lease, nor 
under the LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT. 
22. During the first year, ending on December 31, 
1987, or the second year ending on December 31, 1988, or the 
third year ending on December 31, 1989, of the Gart Bros 
Lease, Gart Bros did not achieve gross sales in sufficient 
amounts so as to obligate Gart Bros to pay to Hermes 
percentage rents in excess of $ 10,000.00. 
23. Gart Bros did not make a percentage rent 
payment to Hermes Associates, in any twelve month period, of 
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a sum in excess of Ten Thousand ($ 10,000.00) Dollars for the 
total space 20,820 square feet) leased to Gart Bros. 
24. Plaintiff is entitled to receive and does 
receive from Gart Bros the information regarding Gart bros 
sales in the leased premises. It is Plaintiff's 
responsibility that Plaintiff should provide the information 
so received to the Defendant, as soon as possible after 
receiving it from Gart Bros. 
25. Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment 
interest, at the rate of 10% per annum, amounting to the total 
sum of $ 1,990.93 as of the date of the trial, together with 
an accrued daily interest at the prejudgment rate of $ 6.03 
for each day from January 11th, 1990, until the date of the 
entry of the judgment, and thereafter at the rate of 12% per 
annum. 
26. Neither party is entitled to an award of 
attorneyf s fees. 
27. Plaintiff is entitled to its costs in 
connection with this action. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now 
enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the 
principal sum of $ 22,000.00; plus 
2. Pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per 
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annum from the date that each monthly installment was due to 
the date of the entry of the judgment, which sum is $1,990.93 
as of January 11th, 1990, plus such additional sum equal to 
the rate of $ 6.03 per day until the date of the entry of the 
judgment, and thereafter interest at the rate of 12% per 
annum. 
3. Plaintiff is entitled to its costs of suit the 
same to be submitted by affidavit to the court by plaintiff's 
counsel. 
4. Neither party is entitled to an award of 
attorneyf s fees. 
5. Defendant is entitled to be notified of the 
volume of the annual gross sales generated by Gart Bros in the 
entire 20,820 square foot leased premises; plaintiff shall 
notify defendant as soon as plaintiff obtains the information 
relating to the volume of sales from Gart Bros. 
6. Defendant should not be required to make 
payments under the LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT at such time 
as Plaintiff receives from Gart Bros a percentage rental 
payment in excess of Ten thousand ($ 10,000.00) Dollars, which 
sum is calculated against a gross sales base of One Million 
Eight Hundred Thousand ($ 1,800,000.00) Dollars, regardless of 
what minimum rent may apply to the Gart Lease before 
percentage rentals become applicable thereunder. 
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DATED this >y day of February, 1990. 
/ HOMER F. WILKINSON 
/ District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE: 
JA 
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD 
Attorneys for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law to Mr. Jackson Howard, attorney for 
defendant, 120 East 300 North Street, P. 0. Box 778, Provo, 
Utah 84603, postage prepaid, this ^y>?A- day of February, 
1990. 
HAPARK.11 
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APPENDIX "B" 
Judgment 
NICK J. COLESSIDES (# 696) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
466 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3303 
Tele: (801) 521-4441 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HERMES ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PARK'S SPORTSMAN, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant, 
JUDGMENT 
C U > , 
Case No. C-88-6074 
Judge: Wilkinson 
This matter came on regularly for trial, pursuant 
to notice, on the 11th day of January, 1990, before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding without a jury; 
Plaintiff Hermes Associates was present by and through J. Rees 
Jensen, one of its General Partners, and plaintiff was being 
represented by Nick J. Colessides, attorney at law; defendant 
Park's Sportsman, a Utah corporation, was present by Russell 
W. Park, its president, and was being represented by Jackson 
Howard, attorney at law; the Court having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED 
that Plaintiff HERMES ASSOCIATES be awarded judgment against 
defendant PARKfS SPORTSMAN, a Utah Corporation, in the amount 
of: 
$ 22,000.00 Principal balance 
$ 2,189.92 Accrued interest to date of judgment 
$ 83.25 Accrued costs to date of judgment 
$ 24,273.17 TOTAL JUDGMENT 
with interest on the total judgment at 12.0% per annum as 
provided by law from the date of this judgment until paid, 
plus after accruing costs; and 
IT IS HEREBY, FURTHER, ORDERED that Defendant is 
entitled to be notified of the volume of the annual gross 
sales generated by Gart Bros in the entire 20,820 square foot 
leased premises; plaintiff shall notify defendant as soon as 
plaintiff obtains the information relating to the volume of 
sales from Gart Bros. 
IT IS HEREBY, FURTHER, ORDERED that Defendant 
should not be required to make payments under the LEASE 
CANCELLATION AGREEMENT at such time as Plaintiff receives from 
Gart Bros a percentage rental payment in excess of Ten 
thousand ($ 10,000.00) Dollars, which sum is calculated 
against a gross sales base of One Million Eight Hundred 
Thousand ($ 1,800,000.00) Dollars, regardless of what minimum 
rent may apply to the Gart Bros Lease before percentage 
rentals become applicable thereunder. 
DATED this X * day of February, 1990, 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE: 
JACKStJN (ftdWARD 
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Judgment to Mr. 
Jackson Howard, attorney for defendants 120 East 300 North 
Street, "P.O. Box 778, Provo, Utah 84^ fc)3^  postage prepaid, 
this y^l4f day of February, 1990. 
HAPARK.13 
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APPENDIX "C" 
Lease Cancellation Agreement 
(Exhibit 1) 
LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered Into this 2nd day of April, 1987, by 
and between Hermes Associates, a Utah partnership, hereinafter called "Hermes" 
and Park's Sportsman, a Utah corporation, hereinafter called "Park's * and 
WHEREAS, Hermes and Park's have entered into a Commercial and Industrial 
Lease under an Agreement dated May 20, 1982, and 
WHEREAS, it is the intent and purpose of the parties to this Agreement 
to cancel said Lease Agreement conditioned upon certain terms and conditions 
herein stated, 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants of each of 
the parties hereto 
IT IS AGREED: 
1. Lease Agreement Cancellation. The Commercial and Industrial 
Lease Agreement of May 20, 1982, and all subsequent addendums or modifications 
are incorporated herein by reference. The said Lease Agreement and all addendums 
and modifications are hereby declared cancelled effective as of the date on which 
a Lease Agreement between Hermes and Cart Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc. becomes 
effective. 
2. Consideration. In consideration of the cancellation of said 
Agreement, Park's does by this instant agree to pay Hermes the sum of One Thousand 
Dollars (51,000.00) per month for a term of sixty (60) months commencing on the 
1st day of May, 1987, and continuing thereafter until sixty (60) installments 
have been paid or unless the said obligation is terminated or cancelled by 
reason of the operation of Provision 3 following. 
3. Termination and Rebate. Hermes acknowledges that effective on 
the date that Hermes enters into a Lease Agreement with Gart Brothers Sporting 
Goods, Inc. for the lease rights of Park's to the premises located at approxi-
mately 5666 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah that this Lease Cancellation 
Agreement will become contemporaneously effective. When and if Gart Brothers 
Sporting Goods, Inc. make a percentage rent payment to Hermes in any twelve (12) 
month period of a sum in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) for the 
subject demised premises, Hermes will cancel the payment requirements of 
Provision 2 above and thereafter Park's will have no obligation to make further 
installment payments, provided that all installment payments previously due and 
payable to Hermes have been paid. It is further provided that at such time as 
Hermes receives the first said percentage rental payment in excess of Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) from Gart Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc., Hermes 
will refund to Park's up to Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) in accordance 
to the amount due and paid by Park's during the twelve (12) months for which 
said percentage rent was paid to Hermes by Gart Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc. 
*•• Satisfaction of Promissory Note. Upon receipt by Hermes of the 
sum of One Hundred Thirty Thousand Dollars ($130,000.00) from Gart Brothers 
Sporting Goods, Inc. (due and payable on or before May 1, 1987) aa reimburse-
ment for che total sum of One Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($K8.500.00) paid by Hermes to Psrk's for tenant leasehold improvements in the 
subject demised premises, Hermes shall return to Park's that certain promissory 
note dated August 1, 1986 covering said sum marked "Paid in Full." 
PARX'S SPORTSMAN, a Utah corporation 
BY: 
ATTEST: Secretary 
HERMES ASSOCIATES, a Utah partnership 
BY: JJk+L'Jt L^  
/ J J. Rees Jenay* ' 
1 / Senior General Partner 
APPENDIX "D" 
May 23, 1988, Letter from Hermes to Park's 
(Exhibit 14) 
I ^EXHIBIT 
HERMES ASSOCIATES 
May 23, 1988 
Certified Mail - Return Receipt Requested 
Russell and Randy Park 
Park's Sportsman 
644 North State 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Re: Letter received from Jackson Howard dated May 17, 1988 
Dear Russ and Randy, 
I am in receipt of a letter addressed to Rees Jensen dated May 17, 1988 
from Jackson Howard. As you know I am head of operations and responsible 
for the collection of past due monies. In such capacity I am responding 
to clarify what seems to be a misunderstanding. 
First and most important to understand, with respect to your $1,000 obligation 
that the agreement and lease we had with Park Sporting Goods has nothing 
whatever to do with the agreement and lease that we have with Gart Sporting 
Goods. I have included herewith a copy of the lease cancellation agreement 
wherein the details are specified. After the whereas1 and now therefore1s, 
there are four points to the agreement. First the lease is cancelled, 
second, in consideration of the cancellation, you have an obligation to make 
$1,000 per month payment for 60 months or five years. Third, in the event 
that Gart Brothers begins paying percentage rents in excess of $10,000 your 
further obligation on the $1,000 per month portion in item 2 would terminate 
and you would also get a refund. Tourth, there was the issue of the satis-
faction of the promissory note. 
Item #1 as stated above has been completed in as much as your lease has been 
terminated. Item #4 as above explained has also been completed and there 
only remains items 2 and 3. You have an obligation to pay us $1,000 a month 
every month for 60 months. That is not tied to the terms of your lease nor 
Is it tied to the terms of the Gart Brothers lease. That is simply an obli-
gation that you carry as a consideration for the lease cancellation. 
In our agreement we further went on to say that in the event that Gart Brothers 
began paying percentage rent which would exceed $10,000 for any 12 month period 
that your obligation would cease. Note that the agreement says when and if 
Gart Brothers Sporting Goods begins to make percentage rent payments in a 12 
month period or a sum in excess of $10,000. Thus far Gart Brothers has not 
paid any percentage rent. 
OWNER/DEVELOPER OF f£ j the Fumflu Center SHOPPING CENTERS •COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES •INVESTMENTS 
C U C n u C P n u n r ^ . v ! ^ *~~ — ~ — — 
Russell and Randy Park 
May 23, 1988 
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Your attorney raises three questions in his letter which have nothing to do 
with anything. In Item #1 he states that you assumed that the percent rent 
clauses in the two leases would be identical• That is not part of our agree-
ment. It was not spoken, and it is not written. The only reference to 
percentage rents that has anything to do with you is the statement that when 
and if Gart Brothers pays percentage rent, your obligation will cease subject 
to the exact language. Item #2 in your attorneys letter makes no sense to 
me and therefore I canft respond to it. Item #3 in your attorney^ letter has 
to do with the increase of space. Nothing in our agreement between Hermes 
Associates and Parks precludes us from making any further deals with Gart 
Brothers. We have in fact made a deal for additional space but that has 
nothing to do with the lease cancellation agreement that I have included here-
with. 
The upshot of this letter is that there is not relationship between Parks 
lease which has been cancelled and the Gart Brothers lease which is now in 
effect as it was originally done or as it may be modified or modified in the 
future. The only tie between Garts and Parks is the lease cancellation 
agreement and the only item of concern to Parks is whether or not Gart Brothers 
is or has made any percentage rents. The fact of the matter is that Garts have 
not paid percentage rents, are not in percentage rents by the terms of their 
lease as has been reported to us by and through terms which are specified in 
their lease. 
I fail to understand all of the confusion on your side and the apparent 
continued supposition that there is some great dark secret that is being 
kept from you. The lease cancellation agreement is very clear and I am 
hereby certifying to you that Garts has paid us not penny one in percent 
rent. At such [time asrwe receive percentage rents from them, we will honor 
the term of clause 3 of our lease cancellation agreement but until that time 
we expect to receive from Parks $1,000 per month for the period of 60 months 
which began on the first day of May, 1987. 
I am sure that Garts would be willing to tell you as to whether or not they * 
have paid percentage rents at THE .FAMILY £ENTER .at MIDVALLEY if they are askedf 
and we certainly are not keeping anything from you. If you have any further 
questions on the matter please feel free to get in touch with me. I would be 
happy to discuss it with you, I would be happy to meet with you, but I do 
expect the $1,000 per month as per our agreement• At the present time you owe 
us $1,000 for April,-$1,000 for Hay, and we will have another payment of $1,000 
coming due on June 1st. I fully expect these amounts to be brought current and 
if we do not have checks "in Txand for April and May by June 1st, 1988, we will 
take the appropriate legal action. 
Very truly yours, 
Douglas L. Holmberg 
Vice President and 
Director of Operations Enc. 
DLH/ec 
